Introduction
The Governmenfs Gr. een Paper(NZ Governn1en~ 1985) on industrial relations states t.hat New Zealand legislation considerably restricts the freedom of strike and Jockout.
1 Also. as the discussion docu· ment points out it is possible for a trade union that engages in some fonns of industrial action to find itself def~ending a com n1on law action for dan1ages or injunction (Green Paper. vol. 2. p. 274) . HoVt' very real this latter possibility is has recently been tnade apparent. The extensive media coverage of such cases as Ford and T:ip Top 2 has indeed serv· ed as a reminder that the legal regulation of industrial relations in this country is still subject to the common law as well as statutory law.
The purpose of this short essay is to comment on the use of comn1on Ja¥l action \Vith respect to industrial action. It will be argued that, whil· e the usefulness ofstatutOJ)' restrictions on the freedom to strike can and has already been question· ed (e.g. Woods. 1979 . p. 17ff~ Geare 1982 . similar objections can be raised as regards the appropriateness of common law lim· itations on the freedon1 of industrial action. Furt.h· er and more fundamentally. it is sub111itted that the common law as such is inappropriate in dealing with industrial action in that it risks jeopardising the very concept of the social autonomy of industrial law. The relationship between common law and industrial law in this repsect is an uneasy one and is con1parable to the (by and large) successful move of labour 'law away from the general principles of the civil law in Continental Western Europe. It is therefore to be regretted that the newly · enacted Labour Relations Act 1987~ in transferringjurisdiction in certain com1non law actions and as related to industrial action fron1 the High Court to the LabourCourt limits itself to a basically cosmetic change.
Industrial action: statutory vis-a-vis common law restrictions Until recently. the rna in piece of legislation curbing industrial action was the Industrial Relations Act 1973. HO\\'ever. the practical usefulness oft he statutory restrictions it imposed on slrikes and lockouts has been questioned in the past (Woods ' 1979: Geare 1 982). The criticism has adequately been sun1rnarised in the Green Paper where it is pointed out that ""in a system designed to achieve industrial hannony through negoliated settlement of disputes. iron-rod enforcen1ent n1ay be consider· ed to be counter-productive .. (Green Paper. vol. 2. p. 276) . Thus1 even though a (relatively high) nun1ber of strikes and lockouts were illegal under previous industrial · legislation. the statutory restrictions were seldon1 enforced.
The ne\v Labour Relations Act ai· ms at introduc· ing legislation which is both relevant and (hopefully) useful by clarifying the distinction between lavlful and unlawful industrial action. The ne\v Act does so. for the first ti1ne ever. by explicitly stating that there is a right to strike or lockout regarding interc t disputes. While this statutory right. is not without restrictions 3 , the Labour Relations Act 1987 thus broadens the overall lawfulness of industrial action in relation to disputes of interest (s 233 Labour Relations Act). Also. the statutory penalties on strikes and lockouts are discontinued("" 230(d) Labour Relations Act). Henceforth. the legal ren1edies for unla\vful industrial action are an order for compliance or. alternatively. an injunction and/or da1nages based on an existing (at common law) civil action in tort (s 230(e) Labour Relations Act).
Statu.rory ren1edy: order for t..'Onlpliance
The statutory ren1edy of an order for compliance · is to be seen as a court order for con1pli-ance ~' ith the Act or. n1ore in1portantly. with the collective instrun1ent that js binding on the litigating parties (Labour Relations Bill . . Explanatory Note, pp. VI and VII). As such, it is fully LOnsistent with the philo:sophy behind the new legislation. It is indeed believed that a basic lack offreedorn on behalfofthe collective par1ies to regulate their own relationship {and thus. to a .... u1ne rcsponsi bil ity for their ov.'n behaviour and actions) accounts. at least in part. for the current tnalfunctioningofthe industrial relations systen1. Thus it is assumed that a reduction ofgovernn1ent intervention 1nay be beneficial to the. overall functioning of the y ten1. 4 Areas of reduced invo' lven1ent by the State include both the scope of collective bargaining (Labour Relations Act. part YH) and also. of direct releva nee for the purposes of this discussion. enforcen1ent and adrninistration of co11ective agreen1ents (Labour Relations Act. part VIII).
Briefly. the collective parties are actively encouraged to et up their own n1achinery to govern their relationship during the currency oflhe collective inst.run1ent they have entered ir1to.
5 The effectiveness of that tnachinery in allowing for the peaceful settlen1ent of potential dispute . . is the prirnary responsibility oft he parties thc;nlselves (s I R6( e) Labour Relations Act). It is only when one of the parties r,~ils to abide by the contractual rules it itself helped to establish. that outside assistance can be invoked through the application for a con1pliance order (s l86(f) Labour Relations Act: con1pare s 48 (2) Mulholland ( 1985) to be a debatable question as to whether Courts are nowadays still able to create new tortsb. any such newly established economic torts would unquestionably come within the jurisdiction of the High Court. And~ of course. the Labour Court is not given exclusive jurisdiction \Vith respect to n1ore general (non-economic) torts. all of which may also play a role in the overall context ofindu trial action. Wrong~ul acts such as envisaged by. for instance. the torts of negligence. trespa s or nuisance aH come within this category. Especially cruciat however. is that. \Vhenever the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in relation to torts (s 242) is invoked. the detern1inations by the Court n1ust be based on strictly legal principles only. As it is also the case with respect to injunctions (s 243) and applications for review (s 280), the jurisdiction or the , Court to decide .. as in equity and good conscience it thinks fif. does not apply (s 279(4) Labour Relations Act).
One is left to wonder \vhy what was identified as the first option . . namely the removal. as such . . of cotnn1on la\v rernedies fro111 the industrial scene. was disnl , issed so readily. The Green Paper itself acknO\\'I, edges that a case can indeed be n1ade for granting complete in1munity to indu strial action fron1 con11non la\v action. The justification given for its rejection is however that~ as econon1ic torts are ·· .. . relevant in contexts other than the industrial one. it is questionable as to whether actions carried out in the industrial sphere should be treated differently than if they ,,.,ere perforn1ed by any other individual or group~· (Green Paper, vol. 2, p 277, no. 72) . As · it. will be argued belo\v. such justification is highly unsatisfactory in that it an1ounts to a direct negation of the social autonotny of industrial law.
Ever since the enactn1ent of the first Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1894.
the legal regulation oflabour-n1anagement relations has increasingly proceeded in such a way as to recognise the deficiencies in applying strict principles of con1111on law. In fact the very principle of adopting spec· iallegislation to deal \Vith the relationship bet\veen the parties and the official designation of (registered) unions as the collective representatives of individual \VOrkers and en1ployers are by then1selves proof of the recognition that special prioritiẽs and needs operate on the industrial scene. Hence. the role of the con1mon law has becon1e n1arginal over ti1ne (Szakat . 1981 . p 12) both in the area of individual and collective labour law. A fairly recent illustration of thi acknowledged need for special techniques. procedures. principles and notion s is the statutory concept of unjusti.fiable disn1issal as distinct frotn wrongful di missal at con1 n1on :law. The latest indication of this move towards autonomy is arguably provided by the title it elf of the ne\'l . legislation as being a '"Labour relations .. Act rather than an .. Industrial relations .. Act. The n1ore traditional tern1 of industrial relations. prevalent in Ne\\' Zealand. refers readily to such notions as industry or co. mrnerce and. thus~ it has econotnic connotations. Labour relations, on the other hand~ is a terrn which is commonly used in Europe and has the particular advantage of stressing the presence of a uniquely social component in the labour-managen1ent relationship. Thus it refers to an area of the law which is distinct frorn other branches oft he law regulating econon1ic activity. such as con1pany law or con11nercial la\\' but also the law of contracts and the law of torts.
By explicitly confirn1ing that a co1nmon law cause of action (no rnatter how limited 'this n1ay be under the new Act) still exists, and, n1oreover. that con1n1on law proceedjngs can now be tarted in the Labour Court. the legislature appears to turn back the clock 100 years.
The civil law experience
The relationship between COJnn1on law and industrial/ labour law has undoubtedly always been an uneasy one. The New Zealand situation is by no n1eans unique in this respect. Even in the so-called civil law systen1s ofWestern Europe a con1parable (and likewise uneasy) relationship between the principles of the civil code and specific labour legislation has persisted for n1any years and. at least in son1c instances. forexarnple Switzerland~ stiU continues. However. in Europe as \Veil. the general evolution has been one of gradual recogn· ition of the autonon1y of lahour law by the legislature and, most importantly . . by the social partners then1selvcs. "1 h1s autonomy of labour law on the ("ontinent (Forde. 1985) . However. the en1ployer's ability to recover dan1ages is specifically lin1ited by Article L.411 -12 of the Labour Code. Article L.411 -12 stipulates that the real and personal property a union needs for its n1eetings. training progran1n1es and libraries cannot be se· ized. Thus, an employer's suit fordan1ages will not be allowed to Coree the union into bankruptcy (M Forde. p. 454).
The limited tort liability offr, ench unions is son1ewhat con1parable to the current situation in Britain under the Employn1ent Act 1982. In Britain.lhe Thatcher A. dn1inistration ren1oved the imn1unity in tort 'traditionally enjoyed by unions. Hov.'ever. the I Q82 Act places lim its on the maxirnum amount of tort dan1age that can be awarded. The lin1its are related to the size of the men1bership of the union. the n1axin1un1 amount of dan1ages being £250 000 (i.e. sorne $750 000) in 'the case of a union with 100 000 or more . metnbers (En1ployn1ent Act 1982. s 16).
Conclusion
As civil law on the Continent large' ly per:fonns the san1e functions as the con1n1on law in 
